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Abstract
We investigate the impact on regional welfare of policy competition for FDI when
a multinational firm can strategically react to differences in statutory corporate tax
rates and shift taxable profits to lower-tax jurisdictions. We show that competing
governments may have an incentive to tax discriminate between domestic and multi-
national firms even in the presence of profit shifting opportunities for the latter. In
particular, tax discrimination leads to higher welfare for the region as a whole than
lump-sum subsidy competition when the difference in statutory corporate tax rates
and/or their average is high enough. We also find that policy competition increases
regional welfare by changing the firm’s investment decision when profit shifting mo-
tivations might induce the firm to locate in the least profitable country.
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1 Introduction
Sandoz [...] is trying to exploit latent tax competition between Germany,
Austria and Switzerland [...]. The group, the generics subsidiary of Switzer-
land’s Novartis, has been based in Vienna since its creation last year. But
[...] is considering a move to Munich or Basel [and it] has asked all three
countries to state what they could offer in terms of taxes and other benefits.
(Financial Times, April 14, 2005)
Foreign direct investment plans reported to the South Korean government
fell 9.6 per cent last year [...] The fall in FDI plans was expected as a tax
reduction period for foreign investors had been cut to seven years from 10
years from the beginning of 2005. The [Commerce] ministry said: “It will
be difficult for the FDI to increase significantly because of [...] competition
with a neighboring country.” (Financial Times, January 6, 2006)
The ones above are just two of the many examples illustrating the importance of taxes
and fiscal incentives for the investment decisions of multinational firms. In addition, they
put forward the idea that countries compete against each other in order to attract foreign
investors within their national borders.
In recent years, indeed, governments throughout the world - at the national or sub-
national level - have designed and implemented policies with the aim of attracting foreign
direct investments (FDI). Competition for foreign investments in major production fa-
cilities mostly occurs at an intra-regional level, i.e., between countries belonging to the
same geographic or economic area (e.g., Latin America, South-East Asia, Central and
Eastern Europe) or between regions within the same country. The incentives offered
to foreign investors often consist in corporate tax reductions, tax breaks, tax holidays,
investment tax allowances, or other kinds of specific tax concessions. For instance,
during the 1990s, Brazil has experienced several cases of inter-regional competition for
FDI in the automobile sector, and fiscal incentives typically included state and local
tax holidays (for as long as ten years) in addition to tax breaks on imported materials.
In Western Europe, over the last 20 years, Ireland has successfully employed incentive
packages - including a considerable lowering of corporate taxes - to attract FDI. In 1998
the Czech government, after having lost potential FDI inflows in previous years in favor
of neighboring countries - like Hungary and Poland - eventually approved a package of
incentives including corporate tax relief for ten years for newly-established companies
in the country.1
The empirical evidence focuses mainly on how taxes affect the volume and distri-
bution of FDI (see, e.g., De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, for a survey). But there are
contributions that analyze more specifically the impact of corporate taxation on firms’
1All of these examples are taken from Charlton (2003). For an overview of the policy-competition-
for-FDI issue, see Oman (2001).
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location decisions.2 On the one hand, Devereux and Griffith (1998) find a significant
effect of effective average tax rates on the location choice of subsidiaries of U.S. firms
within Europe. On the other hand, Buettner and Ruf (2007) show that statutory tax
rates are at least as important as labor cost differences for explaining the observed lo-
cation decisions of German multinationals. Moreover, the statutory tax rate is found to
have a considerably stronger predictive power than the effective average tax rate, and
this “might indicate that multinationals take account of profit-shifting opportunities in
the choice of location of their subsidiaries” (Buettner and Ruf, 2007, p. 162).
The relationship between corporate taxation and the location of multinational firms
is an important issue on the political agenda of both the European Union and the OECD.
There is general agreement on the idea that national corporate tax systems should not
discriminate between taxation of purely domestic and of multinational firms. The non-
discrimination principle is recommended by both the European Union and the OECD
(European Communities, 1992, 1998; OECD, 1998) to counter “harmful” tax competi-
tion between governments seeking to attract investments by foreign multinational firms.
In such a sense, one of the major attempts worldwide to limit policy competition for
FDI is represented by State Aid Control in the European Union. If a EU Member
State lowers the tax rate or grants other types of tax advantages only to certain sectors
or to certain types of firms (e.g., coordination centers for multinational firms in Bel-
gium) or to enterprises located in a certain area within the Member State, this would
constitute State aid. The EU State Aid Control system should prevent countries from
offering subsidies in order to attract foreign investors. In spite of that, Vandenbuss-
che and Tan (2005) provide empirical evidence of a more favorable tax treatment for
foreign multinationals compared to similar domestic firms in Belgium. As their results
are not driven by profit shifting issues, there should exist other fiscal incentives besides
cross-country tax differentials to justify lower tax payments by multinational firms. A
possible interpretation is that the country offers specific fiscal incentives (in terms of,
e.g., under-the-counter subsidies) to foreign investors.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the literature about policy competition for FDI typi-
cally addresses the questions as to which country wins the competition and whether the
winner, in equilibrium, taxes or subsidizes the foreign firm. In particular, the strand
that accounts for imperfect product market competition, country-size asymmetry, and
intra-regional trade costs, develops from the contribution by Haufler and Wooton (1999,
henceforth H&W). This paper analyzes competition between countries of unequal mar-
ket size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. In equilibrium, the big country
succeeds in attracting FDI since the firm prefers locating in the big market in order to
save on trade costs, and the country can even levy a lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s
profits if the size difference is large enough. Ferrett and Wooton (2005) extend H&W’s
2At the sub-national level, Bartik (1985) shows that the corporate tax rate has a significant impact
on business location decisions within the U.S. Subsequent empirical studies on interregional location
decisions have confirmed this result. See Phillipps and Goss (1995) for a survey.
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model to study policy competition for investments by two firms from the same industry
and show that either one firm locates in each country and all of the firms’ profits are
taxed away by host countries or the big country is able to attract both firms by taxing
them due to its market access advantage. Hence, tax competition under duopoly would
not necessarily create a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates. Bjorvatn and
Eckel (2006) modify H&W’s set-up by introducing a private competitor for the foreign
investor in the big country. The equilibrium policy may be either a subsidy or a tax
depending on whether the location advantages offered by the two countries are similar
or not. An interesting result is that aggregate welfare (the sum of regional welfare and
the investor’s profits) rises whenever the introduction of policy competition changes the
investor’s location decision. Finally, in a simpler but more general model, Ferrett and
Wooton (2006) show that tax/subsidy competition for mobile plants is not affected by
the international distribution of firm ownership. Policy competition, indeed, equalizes
the firm’s after-tax profits across countries, thereby making capital owners indifferent
to the location of production. However, none of these papers takes into account the
fact that multinational firms consider profit-shifting opportunities when choosing the
location of their subsidiaries, and most of them lack a regional welfare analysis of policy
competition.3
Our paper aims at investigating the impact on regional welfare of policy competition
for FDI when the foreign multinational can strategically react to differences in statutory
corporate tax rates and shift taxable profits to lower-tax jurisdictions. In particular,
we want to understand whether it can be welfare-improving for the region as a whole
that countries compete against each other by offering further tax incentives when their
national corporate tax systems already give the multinational some opportunities to
minimize its worldwide tax liabilities. Our main result indicates that, in the presence of
profit shifting, tax discrimination might be more desirable - in terms of regional welfare
- than subsidy competition as a policy instrument to attract FDI. This raises doubts
about the pertinence of the non-discrimination principle in the European Union context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present and justify the
main assumptions and the structure of the theoretical framework we use to analyze policy
competition for FDI. In Section 3, we analyze a set-up where no profit shifting takes
place and discuss the welfare implications of policy competition. Section 4 introduces
the possibility of profit shifting in response to statutory tax rate differentials. We then
perform an analysis that parallels that of the previous Section and compare the results.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions emerging from this work.
3Fumagalli (2003) investigates the effects on regional welfare of subsidy competition for FDI when
the location of the multinational firm exerts a positive externality in terms of a technological spillover
to local firms. One of the competing countries benefits more from the inward investment but, in the
absence of incentives, the other, more advanced, country is the multinational’s preferred location. Hence,
subsidies may increase regional welfare by inducing the multinational to locate where it generates the
highest welfare gains.
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2 The model
We develop a model in which two potential host countries, A and B, belonging to
the same region (or economic or geographical area) compete between them to attract
investments by a foreign-owned firm from a third-country - we call the latter country
F and we can think of it as the rest of the world. Once located in the region, the firm
will be the only supplier of some final good to the consumers of the whole region and it
will thus behave as a monopoly. To this end, it must establish a production facility in
either A or B.4
We want to investigate the regional welfare effects of policy competition for FDI when
the foreign multinational can strategically react to differences in corporate tax rates and
shift taxable profits to lower-tax jurisdictions. Hence, we represent policy competition
by a three-stage game with complete information characterized by the following sequence
of decisions:
• In stage 1, the governments of countries A and B simultaneously and irreversibly
post bids to attract the foreign investor.
• In stage 2, the foreign multinational decides whether to establish its production
plant in A or in B, and realizes profits by serving the regional market.
• In stage 3, the foreign multinational chooses the amount of profits to declare to
the tax authorities of the countries where it operates, that is either A or B and F .
We solve our three-stage game by backward induction to find its subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Such a game structure is similar to the one used
by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) to analyze exclusive dealing contracts. In their
model, two manufacturers simultaneously bid for representation by a retailer; then,
the latter chooses to represent one (or both or neither) manufacturer; and finally, the
retailer enters into a contract with the party it has chosen to represent. In our model,
we restrict the strategy set of the agent (the foreign multinational) to the choice of
only one principal (the country where it will invest). In addition, we assume complete
information throughout the paper whereas an asymmetric information problem arises
in the third stage of their model.5
Based on the equilibrium outcomes of the different policy competition scenarios we
consider, we discuss the regional welfare impact of these alternative forms of competition
for FDI between countries. As for the policy-competition-stage (stage 1), indeed, we
4Exports of the final good from country F are not a viable option for the foreign firm if we assume
that trade costs between country F and the region are prohibitively high. On the other hand, assuming
that the costs for intra-regional trade are low enough rules out the possibility that duplicating a costly
investment, i.e. setting up two production plants, one in A and one in B, is a profitable strategy for the
foreign firm.
5A possible extension to our paper could treat the relative profitability of alternative locations and/or
the value of outside options as private information of the multinational firm.
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analyze - and compare among them - four alternative scenarios. In the first one, no
policy competition takes place between the two countries but the multinational firm
faces exogenous statutory corporate profit tax rates. In the second scenario, which we
call subsidy competition, we let the two countries compete for FDI by offering lump-sum
subsidies Si (i = A,B) to the foreign multinational, that still faces exogenous statutory
tax rates. In the last two scenarios, governments are allowed to tax discriminate between
domestic and multinational firms. In particular, under perfect tax discrimination, which
we could also call non-linear-tax competition, we let them choose an ad hoc corporate
tax package for the multinational firm; such a package consists of a corporate tax rate
τi ∈ [0, 1] - that country i applies just to the profits the multinational firm declares there
- and of a lump-sum tax (or entrance fee) Ti (i = A,B). On the other hand, under tax
discrimination, or tax competition, the only fiscal policy instrument at the governments’
disposal is the corporate tax rate τi ∈ [0, 1] (i = A,B).
As for the profit-declaration-stage (stage 3), we first analyze the trivial situation
where declared profits in one country coincide with those actually realized there. We
then discuss the impact of profit shifting opportunities by allowing for profit misdecla-
ration when corporate tax rates differ across countries.
2.1 Profits of the multinational firm
We denote by Πi (i = A,B) the before-tax or operating profits that the multinational
firm realizes when it locates its production plant in country i. They represent the profits
that the firm earns by selling the final good to all the consumers of the region.6
The before-tax profitability of the two countries is not the same from the foreign
firm’s perspective. For instance, one country might represent a cheaper production
location than the other or it might ensure an easier access to specific inputs (e.g., high-
skilled workers, raw materials, etc.) for the foreign firm. Similarly, in the presence
of intra-regional trade costs, differences in country - notably, market - size might be
relevant for the firm’s location decision. In what follows, we assume, without loss of
generality, that country B is the best location for the firm’s production plant in the
absence of tax motivations, i.e. it benefits from a location advantage over country A:
Assumption 1 ΠB > ΠA > 0
Assumption 1 further implies that the foreign firm has always an incentive to invest in
the region regardless of any tax incentive offered by the two countries. In such a sense,
ΠA and ΠB may be considered as the extra-profits that the foreign multinational obtains
by locating in the region with respect to some outside option from investing somewhere
else.
6Before-tax profits may include any kind of fixed and/or variable production costs. Note also that
fixed set-up costs do not affect the investment decision of the multinational as long as they are symmetric
across the two countries. In this case, treating them as tax-deductible or non-tax-deductible does not
change our results.
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Fiscal considerations, however, might play a role in driving the investment decision of
the foreign multinational. As it is common in the literature, we assume that international
corporate taxation follows the source principle, so that profits are taxed where they are
generated.7 To this end, we denote by tA, tB ∈ [0, 1] the statutory corporate tax rates set
by countries A and B, respectively. Similarly, we let country F tax the profits declared
by the multinational firm in its residence country at the rate tF ∈ [0, 1]. These are
the legally imposed rates of corporate taxation which, in principle, should be applied in
order to determine tax liabilities of both domestic and foreign firms operating within
one country’s national borders. To make the analysis of policy competition for FDI
interesting, we assume that country B has a fiscal disadvantage relative to country A:8
Assumption 2 tB > tA
In this way, the foreign multinational always faces a trade-off when deciding in which
country to invest.
We do not make any other specific assumption about the relationship between the
three countries’ statutory tax rates. We want to stress, however, that any tax rate
differential creates profit shifting opportunities for the multinational firm. In fact, firms
engaging in horizontal (or vertical) FDI own fiscal entities at different locations and can
shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions in many different ways: for instance,
by manipulating transfer prices on intra-firm traded goods; or by allocating high-interest
debt to high-tax jurisdictions; or even by re-assigning common expenses to affiliates in
high-tax countries. All of these techniques allow a multinational firm to minimize its
worldwide tax bill while imposing significant accounting and other costs on the firm
itself.9
To account for the possibility of profit misdeclaration, we denote by pii and piF the
amount of profits that the multinational firm declares to country i and country F tax
authorities, respectively, and we postulate that they may differ from the profits that the
firm actually realizes at each location, denoted by Πi and ΠF . Our argument is that the
firm has to declare the totality of its worldwide profits, i.e. pii + piF = Πi + ΠF , but it
may choose how to allocate taxable profits across the countries where it operates in an
attempt to minimize its overall tax liability. Hence, declared and realized profits in one
country need not coincide. In particular, the amount of profits that the firm shifts from
7Keen (1993), for instance, argues that the effective taxation of multinational firms is source-based,
even though tax codes may stipulate differently.
8It should be clear that if country B enjoys both a location and a fiscal advantage over country A,
policy competition cannot turn the latter into a more attractive location for FDI.
9The existence of profit shifting - notably, from the United States to low-tax countries (or tax
havens) - is widely documented. See Hines (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature
on this issue. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) have recently provided evidence that profit shifting
opportunities exist among OECD countries as well. For an exhaustive overview of the theoretical
literature on international taxation and of its connections with empirical observations, we refer the
reader to Gresik (2001).
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country i to country F (or the other way around) in response to cross-country tax rate
differentials is given by pis ≡ pii−Πi = ΠF − piF . It is evident that, if the firm wishes to
declare more profits than those actually realized in country i (pii > Πi), it has to declare
less profits than those actually realized in its residence country (piF < ΠF ).
Profit shifting entails some costs, which may involve expected fines or hiring tax
experts in order to conceal any profit misdeclaration from tax authorities. We assume
these costs to be increasing in the difference between realized and declared profits, that
is in the amount of profits that the firm reallocates across the two countries, and we
let them also depend on an exogenous parameter, γ ≥ 0, which might reflect govern-
ments’ intensity in controlling tax avoidance by multinational firms, or, alternatively,
international tax base mobility. More specifically, the costs for profit shifting in either
direction, i.e., out of (into) country i into (out of) country F , are given by:
C (γ,Πi − pii) = γ2 (Πi − pii)
2 , i = A,B
As it shall become clear below, such a cost specification leads to the result that tax
motivations make the multinational firm shift the same amount of profits irrespective of
the level of realized profits.10 If we assumed, instead, following Hines and Rice (1994)
and Huizinga and Laeven (2007), that the costs of profit shifting are proportional to the
ratio of shifted to realized profits, the amount of profit shifting would depend on the
level of the profits realized in the higher-tax country. This, however, does not seem to
provide additional insights into the issue we are interested in with respect to the cost
formulation we adopt. Moreover, it has a major drawback in that we would need to
analyze different tax scenarios depending on how tA and tB compare to tF and between
them.
The objective of the multinational firm is to pick the location which maximizes its
after-tax profits. Since it evaluates both profit shifting opportunities and possible fiscal
incentives when taking such a decision, its after-tax profits from investing in country i
can be written as follows:
Πi = Πi +ΠF − tipii − tF (Πi +ΠF − pii)− γ2 (Πi − pii)
2 + Si, i = A,B (1)
where
• Si = 0 under no policy competition;
• Si > 0 under subsidy competition (for given statutory tax rates);
• ti = τi and Si = −Ti < 0 under perfect tax discrimination;
• ti = τi and Si = 0 under tax discrimination.
10The profit-shifting cost function we use here is common in the literature. See, e.g., Swenson (2001),
Kind et al. (2005), Peralta et al. (2006), and Amerighi (2008).
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2.2 Governments and welfare
We assume that the governments of countries A and B are both interested in maxi-
mizing national social welfare and that they decide their fiscal policies to attract FDI
independently. In particular, we let the social welfare of country i when investment
takes place in country j take the following form
W ij =

SBii + TRi − Si if i = j
SBij otherwise
(2)
with i, j = A,B, and where TRi = tipii ≥ 0 denotes the revenue arising from taxation
of the profits declared by the multinational firm to country i’s tax authorities, and Si
measures either the lump-sum subsidy paid to attract FDI (under subsidy competition)
or the entrance fee charged to the foreign firm (under perfect tax discrimination). These
components of country i’s welfare function are equal to zero when investment takes place
in country j.
The first term of the welfare function in (2) captures all the other components of
social welfare that are affected by the investment decision of the foreign multinational
but that do not depend on the amount of profits the latter declares in country i. For
example, domestic consumer surplus, profit dividends to domestic residents from other
firms in the economy, labor market conditions, etc. We call SBij the social benefits for
country i when FDI goes to country j and we denote by ∆SBi ≡ SBii−SBij ≥ 0 the gain
to country i from inward FDI. In fact, country i may benefit from hosting the foreign
firm because domestic consumer surplus is higher - when there are costs for shipping
the final good within the region - or due to other social benefits for the country itself
in terms of, e.g., job-creating opportunities, vertical linkages with domestic suppliers,
technological spillovers which enhance the productivity of local firms in other sectors,
and so on.11
To focus on the role fiscal policies play to attract FDI in the presence of profit shift-
ing, we make the simplifying assumption that the gain in terms of social benefits from
receiving the investment of the foreign multinational is the same for the two countries:
Assumption 3 ∆SBA = ∆SBB
This allows us to analyze policy competition by using the following reduced form of
the welfare function in (2)
W ij =

TRi − Si if i = j
0 otherwise
(3)
11Of course, inward FDI may also generate negative externalities, which would lower the gain to
the country from hosting the foreign firm: e.g., the industrial wastes of the production facility may
contaminate the surrounding environment. In reality, however, national governments seem to value
more the potential benefits from FDI as they are often prone to offer incentives to attract foreign
investors within their borders.
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The maximum amount (lump-sum subsidy) that country i is willing to offer to the
foreign investor, Smaxi , consists in the country’s welfare gain from inward FDI. Hence,
it is represented by a full reimbursement of the taxes paid by the multinational firm on
the profits it declares to country i’s tax authorities, i.e., Smaxi = TRi = tipii, i = A,B.
3 No profit shifting
We analyze as a benchmark the basic set-up where we do not allow the foreign multina-
tional to reallocate taxable profits in response to cross-country tax differentials. Hence,
our model reduces to a two-stage game where the profits declared to one country’s tax
authorities coincide with those earned by operating there, i.e., pii = Πi, i = A,B, F .
In the absence of policy competition for FDI between countries A and B, the foreign
multinational invests in country B if the latter’s location advantage outweighs its fiscal
disadvantage with respect to country A. In particular, FDI goes to country B as long
as the following condition holds:
(1− tB)ΠB > (1− tA)ΠA (4)
Otherwise, tax savings motivations make the foreign firm choose to invest in the least
profitable (before-taxes) location.
We now investigate how fiscal policy competition affects the investment decision of
the multinational. To this end, we assume that the location advantage of country B
cannot be so large - relative to its fiscal disadvantage - that this country attracts FDI
by levying a lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s profits while keeping its corporate tax
rate tB constant:
Assumption 4 (1− tB)ΠB < ΠA
This is a sufficient condition to have a positive subsidy paid by country B to the foreign
firm in the absence of profit shifting. As it shall become clear below, Assumption 4 also
implies that country B can set a positive lump-sum tax on the foreign multinational’s
profits only if tB = 0.
We solve our two-stage game backwards and we easily show that the three forms of
fiscal policy competition we consider here are equivalent in the absence of profit shifting.
Namely, they always induce the foreign firm to invest in the country where it benefits
from a location advantage; this, moreover, maximizes aggregate welfare, defined as the
sum of the two countries’ (or regional) welfare, WRi =W
i
i +W
j
i , and the multinational’s
after-tax profits, Πi.
At the second stage, the multinational firm invests in country B if and only if
(1− tB)ΠB + SB > (1− tA)ΠA + SA
where the values of ti and Si depend on the fiscal scenario we consider.
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At the first stage, policy competition for FDI between countries A and B takes place.
Under subsidy competition (for given statutory corporate tax rates), we know that
the maximum subsidy country i is willing and able to offer to attract FDI is given
by a full reimbursement of the taxes paid by the multinational firm on the profits it
declares to local tax authorities, that is, in the absence of profit shifting, Smaxi = tipii =
tiΠi (i = A,B). The equilibrium subsidy results from an auction where the country
representing the most attractive (subsidy inclusive) location receives the investment by
the foreign firm.12 However, the winning country need not actually pay its maximum
subsidy but just the one which is necessary to outbid the rival country, which is given by
S∗i ≡ (1− tj)Πj + Smaxj − (1− ti)Πi, i, j = A,B, i 6= j. Therefore, if governments bid
their maximum subsidies to attract FDI, country B wins the auction and investment
takes place there if and only if
(1− tB)ΠB + SmaxB > (1− tA)ΠA + SmaxA ⇐⇒ ΠB > ΠA
which suggests that subsidy competition cancels out country B’s fiscal disadvantage rel-
ative to A. In particular, it always induces the foreign firm to set up its production plant
in the country where it benefits from a location advantage. It is also straightforward
to check that subsidy competition maximizes aggregate welfare from FDI to country i.
Indeed, we have that
WRB +Π
B = tBΠB − S∗B + (1− tB)ΠB + S∗B = ΠB > WRA +ΠA = ΠA
where the equilibrium subsidy is given by S∗B = (1− tA)ΠA + tAΠA − (1− tB)ΠB =
ΠA − (1− tB)ΠB, which is positive by Assumption 4.
Under perfect tax discrimination or non-linear-tax competition, we assume that coun-
try B’s government chooses an ad hoc corporate tax rate, τB, which is applied just to the
foreign firm’s declared profits, and a lump-sum tax (or entrance fee), TB, to maximize
the revenue it can collect by taxing the multinational firm. Its fiscal policy decision is
constrained by the fact that it is competing with country A. Hence, country B’s offer
has to outbid country A’s best offer to the foreign firm, which is represented by the
possibility of not paying taxes at all there (τA, TA) = (0, 0). The problem of country
B’s government can then be written as follows:
max
τB ,TB
τBpiB + TB
s.t. (1− τB)ΠB − TB ≥ ΠA
where piB = ΠB as, for the time being, we do not allow the firm to misdeclare the
profits actually realized at each location. Note that if the constraint of the problem
above were not binding, there would be no real competition for FDI between the two
12The same equilibrium outcome arises if we assume Bertrand price competition between countries.
We provide a more general and formal definition of the equilibrium of the policy-competition-for-FDI
game in the Appendix.
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countries. Then, as we are not interested in cases where policy competition resolves into
a new tax instrument for country B, any fiscal package (τ∗B, T
∗
B) satisfying the constraint
t∗BΠB + T
∗
B = ΠB − ΠA solves this problem. Due to Assumption 4, country B sets a
positive lump-sum tax T ∗B > 0 if and only if τ
∗
B = 0; otherwise, for any τ
∗
B > 0, it
pays a lump-sum subsidy T ∗B < 0; in particular, τ
∗
B ∈ [0, 1] and T ∗B ∈ [−ΠA,ΠB −ΠA].
Therefore, country B always wins the competition for FDI by fully extracting the foreign
firm’s location gain from investing there, ΠB −ΠA > 0. As before, it is trivial to verify
that perfect tax discrimination maximizes aggregate welfare.
Under tax discrimination or tax competition, the two governments just choose the
rate τi at which the multinational firm’s declared profits are taxed. In this case, country
A’s best offer is represented by a zero tax rate, i.e., τA = 0, and the problem of country
B’s government simplifies to
max
τB
τBpiB
s.t. (1− τB)ΠB ≥ ΠA
For the same reason as before, the solution comes from the constraint holding with
equality, which gives τ∗B = 1 − ΠAΠB ∈ [0, 1]. Once again, country B always wins the
competition for FDI and aggregate welfare is maximized.
But what happens to regional welfare? Does policy competition for FDI allows the
region as a whole and its residents to enjoy more resources?
In the first instance, we argue that whenever policy competition does not change the
investment decision of the foreign multinational, regional welfare is always lower than
in the no policy competition scenario. In fact, we want to focus on situations where
both countries could potentially receive FDI, hence they really have to compete against
each other to affect the firm’s choice. Under no policy competition, if the multinational
chooses to invest in country B, regional welfare is given by WRB,No = tBΠB. Under
subsidy competition, country B always succeeds in attracting FDI but regional welfare
decreases to WRB,Sub = tBΠB − S∗B = ΠB − ΠA < WRB,No since S∗B > 0 by Assumption
4. Similarly, under either kind of tax competition, regional welfare is equivalent to the
subsidy competition scenario, thus lower than without competition. In this case, country
B might be able to fully extract the foreign firm’s gain from locating there, but it has
to forgive the opportunity of taxing the firm’s profits by lowering its corporate tax rate
to zero.
Absent policy competition and profit shifting, however, the firm might choose to
invest in the fiscally-advantageous country A in order to save on tax payments. If this
were the case, any form of policy competition may increase regional welfare by making
the multinational invest in the location-advantageous country B, and so we can state
Proposition 1 When the difference in statutory corporate tax rates within the region
is sufficiently large, the region as a whole benefits from any kind of policy competition
for FDI between countries.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The main message of this Section is that, in the absence of profit shifting, large
differentials in statutory corporate tax rates between the two countries may drive the
FDI decision of the multinational firm in a way which does not maximize welfare for
the region as a whole. In this case, allowing countries to compete for FDI may increase
regional welfare since policy competition makes the firm invest in the most profitable
(before-taxes) location. In the next Section, we investigate whether the regional-welfare-
improving impact of policy competition for FDI and the equivalence between the differ-
ent fiscal policies we analyze are robust to profit shifting by the multinational firm in
response to tax rate differentials.
4 Profit shifting
We now investigate the most interesting set-up where the foreign multinational is able to
shift, at some cost, taxable profits to low-tax jurisdictions in response to cross-country
tax differentials. To this end, we solve by backward induction the three-stage game
described at the beginning of Section 2 to find its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
4.1 Stage 3: profit declaration
At the last stage of the game, the foreign multinational chooses the amount of profits
to declare to the tax authorities of the countries where it operates, that is either A or
B and F . When taking such a decision, the firm can observe statutory corporate tax
rates in country i (i = A,B) and country F , the fiscal incentives offered by countries
A and B if policy competition occurs, and the level of before-tax profits it can realize
by locating in either country. The firm then chooses the amount of profits to declare to
country i’s tax authorities, pii, in order to maximize its after-tax profits as given by (1).
This, in turn, determines the level of declared profits in country F , piF .
Using (1) and optimizing with respect to pii, we obtain
pii = Πi − ti − tF
γ
and piF = ΠF +
ti − tF
γ
(5)
from which it follows that no profit misdeclaration takes place when countries i and F tax
corporate profits at the same rate. However, for any ti 6= tF , the multinational always
declares higher profits than those actually realized in the lower-tax country and lower
profits in the higher-tax country. Note also that any kind of lump-sum subsidies/taxes
set by countries A and B does not affect the multinational firm’s profit declaration
choice.
Since we do not want the firm to declare negative profits in the high-tax country,
which would otherwise subsidize it at the prevailing corporate tax rate, we need to
12
assume that profit shifting is costly enough, i.e.
γ >
|ti − tF |
min {Πi,ΠF } , i = A,B (6)
as we are not making any specific hypothesis about the relationship between Πi and
ΠF . This guarantees that the multinational firm shifts part of its realized profits from
the high-tax to the low-tax country and at the same time declares nonnegative profits
in both of the countries where it operates. In what follows, we call (6) the non-negative-
profit-declaration condition.
4.2 Stage 2: FDI decision
At the second stage, the foreign multinational chooses whether to establish its production
plant in country A or in country B, and, depending on its investment decision, realizes
profits (ΠA or ΠB) by serving the regional market. At this stage of the game, the firm
takes the fiscal policies of the two countries as given and invests in the country where it
earns larger after-tax profits.
Using the firm’s objective function (1), where we substitute for stage-3 optimal
declared profits (5), and rearranging terms, the multinational’s after-tax profits from
investing in country i and shifting profits out of (or into) country F under the policy
competition scenario k ∈ {No, Sub, Tax,Disc} can be rewritten as13
Πi,k = (1− ti)Πi + (1− tF )ΠF + Si + (ti − tF )
2
2γ
, i = A,B (7)
where the last term represents the net gain to shift taxable profits from the high-tax to
the low-tax country in response to any tax differential between them.
If countries A and B do not compete to attract FDI (Si = 0, i = A,B), the foreign
multinational invests in country B as long as the following condition holds:
(1− tB)ΠB +
(tB − tA)
(
t− tF
)
γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative PS gain/loss
> (1− tA)ΠA (8)
where t ≡ tA+tB2 is the average statutory corporate tax rate in the region and PS is
an acronym for profit shifting. A comparison of (8) with the corresponding condition
in the absence of profit shifting, i.e., condition (4), suggests that, for a given tB > tA,
profit shifting opportunities may turn the fiscally-disadvantageous country B into a
relatively more attractive location for the foreign firm’s investment. In particular, when
the average tax rate prevailing in the region is higher than the residence country’s tax
rate
(
t > tF
)
, the multinational finds it relatively more interesting to invest in the higher-
tax country as profit shifting partially offsets country B’s fiscal disadvantage. Otherwise,
13The terms No, Sub, Tax, and Disc, stand for no policy competition, subsidy competition, perfect
tax discrimination, and tax discrimination, respectively.
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when t < tF , profit shifting opportunities work in favor of the lower-tax country. Stated
differently, if profit shifting goes out of (into) the region, the country setting the higher
(the lower) corporate tax rate becomes, ceteris paribus, more attractive. In spite of
that, in the presence of profit shifting, larger tax differentials always make the fiscally-
advantageous country A more profitable from the foreign firm’s perspective as the gain
from shifting profits out of the high-tax country cannot compensate for the cost of
paying taxes there. Then, condition (8) is less likely to hold. This can be easily seen
by differentiating (8) with respect to tA or tB and recalling the non-negative-profit-
declaration condition (6).
Under subsidy competition (for given statutory corporate tax rates), countries A and
B offer lump-sum subsidies that affect the relative profitability of the two alternative
locations. In particular, when each country bids its maximum subsidy, Smaxi (i = A,B),
the foreign multinational invests in country B if and only if
(1− tB)ΠB +
(tB − tA)
(
t− tF
)
γ
+ SmaxB > (1− tA)ΠA + SmaxA (9)
Under perfect tax discrimination, countries A and B are endowed with two fiscal
policy instruments and compete over both tax rates, τi, and lump-sum taxes, Ti (i =
A,B). Then, the multinational firm chooses to invest in country B if and only if
(1− τB)ΠB + (τB − τA) (τ − tF )
γ
− TB > (1− τA)ΠA − TA (10)
where τ ≡ τA+τB2 is the average ad hoc corporate tax rate of the two countries and the
fiscal package (τi, Ti) represents country i’s offer to the foreign investor.
Finally, under tax discrimination, countries A and B compete just over tax rates, τi,
and the foreign multinational invests in country B as long as
(1− τB)ΠB + (τB − τA) (τ − tF )
γ
> (1− τA)ΠA (11)
where the tax rate τi results from the welfare maximization problem of country i, which
we analyze - together with subsidy competition and perfect tax discrimination - in the
next subsection.
4.3 Stage 1: policy competition for FDI
At the first stage, the governments of countries A and B simultaneously and irreversibly
post bids to attract the foreign investor. The objective of each country’s government is
to maximize the national welfare gain from receiving FDI.
As we claimed before, we investigate four alternative policy-competition-for-FDI sce-
narios. Under no policy competition, the two countries do not offer any tax incentive
to the foreign multinational. Hence, the firm takes its investment decision according to
condition (8) and regional welfare and the firm’s after-tax profits are given, respectively,
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byWRA,No = tApiA and Π
A,No = (1− tA)ΠA+(1− tF )ΠF+ (tF−tA)
2
2γ if FDI goes to coun-
try A, or WRB,No = tBpiB and Π
B,No = (1− tB)ΠB + (1− tF )ΠF + (tF−tB)
2
2γ otherwise,
where piA and piB are the firm’s optimal declared profits in (5). In the other scenarios, we
let the two countries compete for FDI either by offering to the multinational lump-sum
subsidies (for given statutory tax rates), or by choosing both the corporate tax rate and
a lump-sum tax on the firm’s profits, or simply the ad hoc corporate tax rate.
Under subsidy competition, the maximum subsidy country i is willing and able to
offer is represented by a full reimbursement of the taxes paid on the profits declared by
the firm to country i’s tax authorities, that is, Smaxi = tipii (i = A,B). Namely, since
profit shifting allows the firm to misdeclare realized profits at each location in response
to tax rate differentials, the maximum subsidies bid by countries A and B are given by
SmaxA = tA
(
ΠA − tA − tF
γ
)
and SmaxB = tB
(
ΠB − tB − tF
γ
)
(12)
where we replace pii with stage-3 optimal declared profits (5). We know from condition
(9) that the foreign firm invests in the country representing the most profitable (subsidy
inclusive) location. Substituting for the two countries’ maximum subsidies (12) and
rearranging terms, this condition reduces to
ΠB −ΠA > (tB − tA) t
γ
(13)
which suggests that subsidy competition induces the multinational to invest in country
B as long as profit shifting motivations are less important for the firm than the location
advantage of setting up a production plant there. In the presence of profit shifting,
indeed, subsidy competition cannot offset country B’s fiscal disadvantage relative to A.
When condition (13) holds, country B wins the competition for FDI. In equilibrium,
however, it does not need to pay its maximum subsidy but just the one which is necessary
to outbid its competitor. Hence, the equilibrium subsidy country B pays to attract FDI
in the presence of profit shifting opportunities for the firm amounts to
S˜∗B = S
∗
B +
2tBtF − t2B − t2A
2γ
where S∗B is country B’s equilibrium subsidy in the absence of profit shifting. Thus,
depending on statutory corporate tax rates, S˜∗B can be either higher or lower than S
∗
B.
In particular, if the multinational is interested in shifting taxable profits into the region
(tF > tA, tB) or simply to the lower-tax country (tB > tF > tA), the subsidy country
B has to pay to attract the foreign investor is higher than without profit shifting, i.e.
S˜∗B > S
∗
B. Otherwise, for tA, tB > tF , the multinational finds it relatively more profitable
to invest in the higher-tax country as it can now shift taxable profits out of the region,
which leads to S˜∗B < S
∗
B.
The discussion above allows us to conclude that, in the presence of profit shifting,
both countries can win subsidy competition for FDI. If country B attracts the foreign
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investor, regional welfare is equal to
WRB,Sub = tBpiB − S˜∗B = ΠB −ΠA −
(tB − tA) t
γ
and, substituting for S˜∗B into equation (7), the multinational’s after-tax profits from
investing in country B and shifting profits out of (or into) country F are given by
ΠB,Sub = ΠA + (1− tF )ΠF + t
2
F − t2A
2γ
On the other hand, if it is country A that receives FDI, regional welfare is given by
WRA,Sub = tApiA − S˜∗A =
(tB − tA) t
γ
− (ΠB −ΠA) = −WRB,Sub
where S˜∗A = ΠB− (1− tA)ΠA+ 2tAtF−t
2
B−t2A
2γ is derived in the same way as S˜
∗
B. It is then
immediate to compute the multinational’s after-tax profits from investing in country A
and shifting profits out of (or into) country F by replacing S˜∗A into equation (7).
The following Proposition summarizes our findings about subsidy competition for
FDI in the presence of profit shifting:
Proposition 2 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subsidy-competition-for-
FDI game
• if country B’s location advantage is more important for the foreign firm than profit
shifting opportunities, i.e., condition (13) holds:
– country B wins the competition for FDI and pays a subsidy S˜∗B;
– the foreign firm invests in B and declares profits piB = ΠB − tB−tFγ and
piF = ΠF + tB−tFγ ;
– the payoffs to country B (hence, to the region), to country A, and to the
foreign firm are given by WBB =W
R
B,Sub = ΠB −ΠA− (tB−tA)tγ , WAB = 0, and
ΠB,Sub = ΠA + (1− tF )ΠF + t
2
F−t2A
2γ , respectively;
• if profit shifting opportunities are more important for the foreign firm than country
B’s location advantage, i.e., condition (13) does not hold:
– country A wins the competition for FDI and pays a subsidy S˜∗A;
– the foreign firm invests in A and declares profits piA = ΠA − tA−tFγ and
piF = ΠF + tA−tFγ ;
– the payoffs to country B, to country A (hence, to the region), and to the
foreign firm are given by WBA = 0, W
A
A = W
R
A,Sub =
(tB−tA)t
γ − (ΠB −ΠA),
and ΠA,Sub = ΠB + (1− tF )ΠF + t
2
F−t2B
2γ , respectively.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Under perfect tax discrimination, the two countries choose both the corporate tax
rate and a lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s profits. In particular, when we allow for
profit shifting opportunities, the problem of country B’s government can be written as
follows:
max
τB ,TB
τBpiB + TB
s.t. (1− τB)ΠB − tB (2tF − tB)2γ − TB ≥ ΠA
where piB = ΠB− τB−tFγ from the firm’s optimal declared profits in (5) and the constraint
comes from condition (10) with τA = TA = 0 as country B’s offer has to outbid country
A’s best offer to the foreign firm. We easily show that the tax pair
(τ∗B, T
∗
B) = (0,ΠB −ΠA)
solves this problem. Hence, country B always wins the competition for FDI by levying a
zero tax rate on declared profits and by fully extracting the foreign firm’s location gain
from investing there by means of a positive lump-sum tax. As a result, regional welfare
is given by WRB,Tax =W
B
B = ΠB −ΠA. This allows us to state
Proposition 3 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game where countries
compete in non-linear-taxes
• country B always wins the competition for FDI by setting (τ∗B, T ∗B) = (0,ΠB −ΠA);
• the foreign firm always invests in B and declares profits piB = ΠB + tFγ and piF =
ΠF − tFγ ;
• the payoffs to country B (hence, to the region), to country A, and to the foreign
firm are given by WBB = W
R
B,Tax = ΠB − ΠA, WAB = 0, and ΠB,Tax = ΠA +
(1− tF )ΠF + t
2
F
2γ , respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for such a result is simple. When the two countries’ governments are
allowed to offer fully flexible tax packages to the foreign investor, the distortions intro-
duced by statutory corporate tax rate differentials and by the profit shifting behavior of
the multinational firm can be eliminated. Then, the country where the firm may enjoy
the largest (before-tax) profits always wins the competition for FDI.14 In equilibrium,
the maximum profit shifting opportunities for the multinational firm arise when τB = 0
14This reminds us the well-known result in the IO literature on vertical product differentiation ac-
cording to which if a high and a low quality good are offered at the same price, then all consumers will
buy the high quality good (see, e.g., Pepall et al., 2008). Here, absent tax distortions, country B will
benefit from a higher intrinsic quality relative to country A because of its location advantage.
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- that is, when country B offers a tax holiday to the firm - and the lump-sum tax allows
country B itself to extract all the relative location rents from investing there.
Under tax discrimination (or tax competition), the two governments do not have the
non-distortionary lump-sum tax at their disposal and just compete over the rate τi at
which the multinational firm’s declared profits are taxed. In this case, the problem of
country B’s government is given by
max
τB
τBpiB
s.t. (1− τB)ΠB + (τB − τA) (τ − tF )
γ
≥ (1− τA)ΠA
where piB = ΠB − τB−tFγ from (5). In the Appendix, we show that the solution to this
problem τ∗B (τA), given country A’s best offer to the foreign firm, τA = 0, is
τ∗B (0) ≡ τˆB = γΠB + tF −
√
(γΠB + tF )
2 − 2γ (ΠB −ΠA)
which is always positive and smaller than 1 for any γ > 1−2tF2ΠA .
15 Note also that, under
the last condition, τˆB is always increasing in ΠB, which suggests that the larger the
before-tax profitability from investing in B (due to, e.g., a larger market size relative to
A), the lower the incentive to tax discriminate in favor of foreign firms, i.e., the higher
the tax rate that country B bids to attract the foreign investor.
Hence, in equilibrium, country B always wins the competition for FDI by setting a
positive tax rate on the foreign firm’s declared profits. Regional welfare is then given by
WRB,Disc =W
B
B = ΠB −ΠA − τˆ
2
B
2γ and it represents the marginal contribution of country
B to aggregate welfare (or total surplus), defined as the unweighted sum of regional
welfare and the firm’s after-tax profits.16 In fact, such a contribution corresponds to the
location advantage of B over A, ΠB − ΠA, minus the loss in terms of overall potential
gains from profit shifting, that is,
[
tF
tF−τˆB
γ − (tF−τˆB)
2
2γ
]
−
[
tF
tF
γ −
t2F
2γ
]
= − τˆ2B2γ .
We summarize our results about tax discrimination in
Proposition 4 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the tax-competition-for-FDI
game
• country B always wins the competition for FDI by setting τˆB ∈ (0, 1);
• the foreign firm always invests in B and declares profits piB = ΠB − τˆB−tFγ and
piF = ΠF + τˆB−tFγ ;
15We cannot say a priori whether this condition is more or less stringent than the non-negative-profit-
declaration condition (6). In any case, we assume that the most stringent of the two holds.
16Our results can be easily interpreted in the light of the common agency literature since our model
considers two principals (the two governments) that submit offers to a common agent (the foreign
investor). In particular, Chiesa and Denicolo` (2008) show that in a common agency game with two prin-
cipals and complete information, each principal’s payoff corresponds exactly to its marginal contribution
to social surplus even when we relax the assumption of truthful strategies.
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• the payoffs to country B (hence, to the region), to country A, and to the foreign
firm are given by WBB = W
R
B,Disc = ΠB − ΠA − τˆ
2
B
2γ , W
A
B = 0, and Π
B,Disc =
(1− τˆB)ΠB + (1− tF )ΠF + (τˆB−tF )
2
2γ , respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4.4 Welfare implications
In this Section, we evaluate the welfare impact of profit shifting by the foreign multina-
tional investing in the region. We analyze first the implications for aggregate welfare and
then investigate whether the introduction of policy competition may enhance regional
welfare by changing the foreign firm’s investment decision. Finally, we show under which
conditions tax discrimination has to be preferred to subsidy competition.
It is easy to check that, even in the presence of profit shifting, any of the three forms
of policy competition for FDI maximizes aggregate welfare. Namely, it always induces
the multinational firm to take the investment decision which yields higher welfare for
the economy as a whole. For example, under subsidy competition, aggregate welfare is
maximized when FDI goes to B as long as
WRB,Sub +Π
B,Sub > WRA,Sub +Π
A,Sub ⇐⇒ ΠB −ΠA > (tB − tA) t
γ
which is equivalent to condition (13), that drives the firm’s FDI choice. Under perfect
tax discrimination, instead, we have that
WRB,Tax +Π
B,Tax > WRA,Tax +Π
A,Tax ⇐⇒ ΠB > ΠA
as this form of competition eliminates the distortions introduced by corporate taxation
and profit shifting opportunities and leads the firm to invest in the country where it
benefits from a location advantage.
Both subsidy competition for FDI and the two forms of tax discrimination maximize
aggregate welfare. However, they are no longer equivalent in the presence of profit
shifting. When countries compete over non-linear taxes, both of them offer a tax holiday
to the foreign firm. The latter takes into account the possibility of not paying taxes at all
on the profits it declares in the country where it sets up its production plant. Hence, it
optimally shifts into the host country as much of its profits as it can since the corporate
tax rate it has to face there is nil. As the potential profit shifting gain is the same
in both countries, the one which benefits from a location advantage, i.e., country B,
always receives FDI. Moreover, it can extract the firm’s profit gain from investing there
by means of the lump-sum tax. Under tax discrimination, country B is still able to
set a tax rate which induces the foreign firm to invest there but it cannot fully enjoy
the location rent because of the loss in terms of profit shifting. By contrast, lump-sum
subsidy competition does not affect profit declaration and profit shifting motivations
play a decisive role for the FDI choice.
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To investigate the effects on regional welfare of policy competition for FDI in the
presence of profit shifting, we assume that either form of competition always decreases
regional welfare when it does not change the multinational firm’s investment decision:
Assumption 5 WRi,k < W
R
i,No, k ∈ {Sub, Tax,Disc}
This allows us to exclude from the analysis the cases where policy competition resolves
into a new tax instrument for the host country and to focus on situations where com-
petition for FDI actually takes place as both countries represent profitable locations
(either before or after taxes) for the firm. Assumption 5 thus implies that under subsidy
competition, both countries have to pay positive equilibrium subsidies to attract FDI; or
under either form of tax discrimination, the cost for country B of lowering the corporate
tax rate on the foreign firm’s profits (either to zero or to some positive value) cannot
compensate for the gain from (full or partial) rent extraction.
Due to our initial Assumptions 1 and 2 and based on our results of Section 4.3,
Assumption 5 allows us to rank regional welfare from FDI to country B as follows:
WRB,No > W
R
B,Tax > W
R
B,Sub and W
R
B,No > W
R
B,Tax > W
R
B,Disc
meaning that no competition has to be always preferred to any form of policy compe-
tition for FDI; if competition takes place, however, perfect tax discrimination always
yields higher regional welfare than subsidy competition or tax discrimination.
Concerning regional welfare from FDI to country A, we have that
WRA,No > W
R
A,Sub
as neither form of tax discrimination can induce the firm to invest there. Note also that
∂WRA,No
∂tA
> 0 if and only if γ > 2tA−tFΠA .
17 Since tB > tA by Assumption 2, a lower tA,
for a given tB, increases the tax difference between them and, if γ is high enough, i.e,
if profit shifting is sufficiently costly, it decreases regional welfare from FDI to B under
no policy competition.
We want to show that policy competition may increase regional welfare by changing
the firm’s FDI decision. In particular, as perfect tax discrimination always leads to
higher regional welfare than the other two forms of policy competition, we focus on the
comparison between WRB,Sub and W
R
A,No. The latter is the best situation for the region
as a whole when FDI goes to A, and, for this to happen, the multinational has to find
it profitable to invest in country A in the absence of policy competition, i.e., ΠA,No >
ΠB,No must hold. It is also easy to check that the welfare of country B - hence, of the
region - corresponds to the marginal contribution of country B to aggregate welfare,
17If tF < tA, the firm shifts taxable profits to country F and W
R
A,No increases with tA if and only if γ
is high enough, meaning that profit shifting is limited by its cost. If tF > 2tA, W
R
A,No always increases
with tA since tF is so high that γ becomes negligible. Finally, if tF ∈ (tA, 2tA), the firm shifts taxable
profits to country A, which can increase its tax revenue by increasing tA as long as γ is high enough.
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and it can thus be defined as the difference between aggregate welfare when the firm
invests in B and when it invests in A, i.e.,WRB,Sub =W
R
B,No+Π
B,No−
(
WRA,No +Π
A,No
)
.
Therefore, provided that ΠA,No > ΠB,No, regional welfare increases as a result of subsidy
competition as long as
WRB,No > Π
A,No −ΠB,No + 2WRA,No
which is more likely to be true when the relative after-tax profitability from investing in
A over B essentially depends on a low statutory corporate tax rate tA or on an important
difference between tA and tB. Indeed, a lower tA increases ΠA,No but, if profit shifting
is costly enough, it simultaneously reduces tax revenues (hence, regional welfare from
FDI to A). This allows us to claim
Proposition 5 In the presence of profit shifting, subsidy competition for FDI may be
beneficial to the region if the difference in statutory corporate tax rates within the region
is large enough.
In fact, for a statutory tax rate difference sufficiently large, we know that the multi-
national firm prefers to invest in the fiscally-advantageous country A absent policy
competition. But as we let this difference increase further - by decreasing tA, for a
given tB - regional welfare from FDI to A may decrease. Hence, subsidy competition
may be regional-welfare improving since it induces the firm to invest in the location-
advantageous country B. This is true provided that profit shifting is so costly that a
reduction in tA does not allow country A to increase the revenue it can collect by taxing
the multinational firm’s profits.
Lastly, we want to demonstrate that, in the presence of profit shifting, tax discrim-
ination might be more desirable than subsidy competition as a policy instrument to
attract FDI. To this end, we need to compare WRB,Disc and W
R
B,Sub, notably the impact
of profit shifting under the two policies, which would otherwise be equivalent. It is then
straightforward to show that
WRB,Disc > W
R
B,Sub ⇐⇒ τˆB ∈
(
0,
√
(tA − tB) (tA + tB)
)
since τˆB cannot be negative. Such a condition is more likely to hold the higher the
statutory corporate tax rate difference or the sum (i.e., the average) of tax rates or both
are. We can thus state
Proposition 6 In the presence of profit shifting, tax discrimination is more likely to
yield higher regional welfare than subsidy competition for FDI when the difference in
statutory corporate tax rates within the region and/or the average statutory corporate
tax rate prevailing in the region are large enough.
To understand why this is so, we just need to look at regional welfare from FDI to
country B under subsidy competition, WRB,Sub = ΠB − ΠA − (tB−tA)tγ , since regional
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welfare under tax discrimination, WRB,Disc, does not depend on the statutory corporate
tax rates tA and tB. We know thatWRB,Sub represents country B’s marginal contribution
to aggregate welfare, where the latter is defined as the sum of regional welfare and the
firm’s after-tax profits, thereby excluding country F . For a given average statutory
tax rate in the region t, a larger difference (tB − tA) decreases country B’s marginal
contribution since the amount of taxable profits the multinational firm shifts into the
region shrinks (or, similarly, profit shifting to the residence country F gets larger). On
the other hand, for a given statutory tax rate difference within the region (tB − tA), a
higher average tax rate t lowers country B’s marginal contribution because a symmetric
increase in statutory tax rates - that keeps the difference between them constant - has a
negative effect on aggregate welfare and such an effect is stronger for the country with
the higher statutory tax rate.
5 Concluding remarks
The phenomenon of competition for FDI is pervasive and mostly takes place between
countries belonging to the same geographic or economic area. The incentives offered
to foreign investors often consist in tax holidays or other kinds of specific tax con-
cessions. Moreover, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that multinational firms
might consider profit shifting opportunities when deciding the location of their foreign
subsidiaries. In order to counter what policymakers label “harmful” tax competition
between governments, both the European Union and the OECD recommend member
countries not to discriminate between taxation of purely domestic and of multinational
firms. In such a sense, one of the major attempts worldwide to limit policy competition
for FDI is represented by State Aid Control in the European Union. This system should
prevent countries from offering subsidies in order to attract foreign investors. But there
is empirical evidence to the contrary.
The objective of this paper has been to investigate the impact on regional welfare
of policy competition for FDI when a foreign multinational can strategically react to
differences in statutory corporate tax rates and shift taxable profits to lower-tax juris-
dictions. In particular, we have tried to understand whether it can be welfare-improving
for the region as a whole that countries compete against each other by offering further
tax incentives when their national corporate tax systems already give the multinational
some opportunities to minimize its worldwide tax liabilities. To this end, we have set
up a model of policy competition for FDI between two countries belonging to the same
region, and we have assumed that one country has a location advantage but a fiscal
disadvantage relative to the other one.
If we rule out profit shifting opportunities, any form of policy competition elim-
inates tax distortions and induces the foreign multinational to invest in the location-
advantageous country. Moreover, when the statutory tax rate difference is large enough,
policy competition increases regional welfare by changing the investment decision of the
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firm. On the other hand, when we take profit shifting opportunities into account, sub-
sidy competition can no longer offset tax distortions. Then, profit shifting motivations
may induce the firm to invest in the fiscally-advantageous country. By contrast, either
form of tax discrimination cancels out the distortions arising from statutory tax rate
differentials and induces the foreign firm to choose the most efficient location for its in-
vestment. In spite of that, subsidy competition may still be regional-welfare-improving
when the statutory tax rate difference is large enough.
Our main contribution has been to prove that, in the presence of profit shifting, tax
discrimination might be preferable - in terms of regional welfare - to subsidy compe-
tition as a policy instrument to attract FDI. This is more likely to be true when the
statutory tax rate difference within the region and/or the average tax rate prevailing
in the region are high. Such a result has important policy implications for, e.g., the
European Union. Indeed, it challenges the propriety of the non-discrimination principle
in an area characterized by both high tax levels and high tax differentials. In this con-
text, tax discrimination, i.e., a policy which is more able to adjust to the profit shifting
activities of multinational firms, might lead to larger benefits than lump-sum subsidy
competition.
We conclude with two remarks on our modeling choices. First, we restrict attention
to tax instruments to attract FDI. This is because we want to focus on policies that
affect profit declaration by the multinational firm, hence its profit shifting ability in
response to the fiscal incentives offered by competing countries. To this end, we do
not let governments choose, e.g., the level of public infrastructure (roads, bridges, rail
connections, airports, etc.) supplied to the firm. This, however, might be captured by
the exogenous difference in before-tax profitability between the two locations as long as
we consider infrastructure as a local public good, whose benefits can be enjoyed by the
firm only by locating in the country where the investment has been made.18
Second, our set-up is characterized by complete information, i.e., the economic agents
(the governments and the multinational firm) know everything they need to know to
take the decisions which maximize their payoffs. But there are several ways to introduce
asymmetric information in our framework.19 For instance, by assuming that the foreign
multinational possesses private information on its outside option from not investing in
18In general, when countries face a set of firms heterogeneous with respect to their infrastructure
needs, they have an incentive to differentiate to the maximum extent as this allows them to reduce the
dissipation of welfare resulting from subsequent tax competition. In such a sense, infrastructure compe-
tition can relax tax competition in the same way as product differentiation can relax price competition
between firms. Hindiks et al. (2008), however, show that the opposite result may hold under revenue
sharing when countries are heterogeneous ex ante in their capacity to attract capital. In particular,
countries strategically choose to under-invest in public infrastructure as they anticipate that public in-
vestments, by enhancing the productivity of capital, will exacerbate subsequent capital tax competition.
See Dembour (2008) for a recent survey of the literature about tax and infrastructure competition.
19Bond and Samuelson (1986), e.g., analyze a situation where the firm is uncertain as to the produc-
tivity of the country where it will potentially invest, and show that tax holidays are an optimal means
by which high-productivity countries can reveal their type.
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the region. That is, the two governments just have some common expectations about
the profitability of an alternative location outside the region for the foreign multina-
tional. If governments are not able to elicit information from the firm, however, the
uncertainty about the value of such an outside option simply resolves into a further
constraint that they may have to take into account when competing for FDI. A more
interesting situation, instead, occurs when the fiscal policy of the host country indirectly
affects the value of the outside option. If, for example, the outside option of the foreign
multinational is given by the possibility of not investing abroad, operating just in its
residence country and paying taxes at some unknown rate there, profit shifting creates
a link between the fiscal policies of the residence and of the host country. Hence, the
host country might be able to design a fiscal policy which induce truthful revelation by
the foreign firm. But this goes beyond the scope of our model and represents a task for
future research.
Appendix
No profit shifting
Policy-competition-for-FDI equilibrium
The problem of country i’s government under the three forms of policy competition we
analyze can be generally formulated in the following way:
max
ti(pii)
ti (pii)
s.t. Πi − ti (pii) ≥ Πj − tj (pij) , i, j = A,B, i 6= j
where the fiscal policy implemented by country i, ti (pii), is a function of the profits the
multinational firm declares to country i’s tax authorities.
The policy-competition-for-FDI game between countries A and B is a Bertrand-
competition-like game in prices with multiple equilibria. In particular, the equilibrium
can be defined as follows
t∗A (piA) = , with  ∈ (0,∞)
t∗B (piB) = ΠB −ΠA
The proof is a straightforward application of the Bertrand-competition solution. Indeed,
for country A, any  ∈ (0,∞) is a best reply to country B’s equilibrium strategy since
A’s payoff is always nil, i.e., it can never attract the foreign investor. For country B, any
other strategy t′B (·) such that t′B (·) > ΠB−ΠA > 0 is not an equilibrium strategy since
country A will have the opportunity of attracting FDI by setting t∗A (·) =  < t′B (·). By
contrast, any other strategy t′B (·) < ΠB − ΠA is not a best reply to t∗A (·) because it
leaves money on the table, i.e., to the foreign multinational firm.
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Proof of Proposition 1
When (1− tA)ΠA > (1− tB)ΠB, the foreign multinational invests in country A in the
absence of policy competition and regional welfare is given byWRA = tAΠA. Competition
between countries changes the FDI decision of the foreign multinational and regional
welfare amounts to WRB = ΠB−ΠA. We want to show that ΠB−ΠA > tAΠA may hold,
in which case policy competition increases regional welfare. For this to be possible, two
conditions have to be satisfied:
(i) the foreign investor chooses to invest in country A in the absence of policy com-
petition if and only if
ΠB <
1− tA
1− tBΠA
that is if the gain in before-tax profits from investing in B cannot compensate for
the fiscal disadvantage of operating in the high-tax country;
(ii) regional welfare increases if and only if
ΠB > (1 + tA)ΠA
Therefore, policy competition increases regional welfare by inducing the firm to invest in
the location-advantageous country if and only if the last two conditions simultaneously
hold, that is if and only if
1− tA
1− tB > 1 + tA ⇐⇒ tB > tˆB (tA) ≡
2tA
1 + tA
≥ tA
For tB ∈
[
tA, tˆB
)
, any kind of policy competition decreases regional welfare, whereas
the opposite holds true for tB ∈
(
tˆB, 1
)
.
Profit shifting
Subsidy competition
If country B’s location advantage is more important for the foreign firm than profit
shifting opportunities, i.e., condition (13) holds, country A can never succeed in attract-
ing FDI even by bidding its maximum lump-sum subsidy SmaxA . On the other hand,
if condition (13) does not hold, it is country B that can never win the competition
for FDI. Hence, similarly to the no-profit-shifting case, the equilibrium of the subsidy-
competition-for-FDI game between countries A and B can be defined as follows
S∗i = , with  ∈ (0, Smaxi )
S˜∗j : Π
j(S˜∗j ) = Π
i (Smaxi ) , for i, j = A,B, i 6= j
The proof is once again a straightforward application of the Bertrand-competition solu-
tion. Indeed, depending on condition (13), one of the two countries, say country i, can
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never attract the foreign investor. For country i, any bid  ∈ (0, Smaxi ) is a best reply to
country j’s equilibrium strategy since i’s payoff is always equal to zero. For country j,
any other strategy S′j < S˜
∗
j is not an equilibrium strategy since country i will have the
opportunity of attracting FDI by setting Smaxi , which would imply Π
i (Smaxi ) > Π
j(S′j).
By contrast, any other strategy S′j > S˜
∗
j is not a best reply to S
∗
i because it leaves to
the foreign firm an extra-benefit that country j could extract.
Perfect tax discrimination or non-linear-tax competition
Under non-linear tax competition, country B’s government chooses the tax pair (τB, TB)
which maximizes the revenue it can collect by taxing the foreign multinational. Such
a choice is constrained by the tax pair set by country A. Hence, for country B to
win, its offer has to outbid the competing country’s best offer, which is represented by
(τA, TA) = (0, 0). We substitute the latter into condition (10) to get the constraint for
country B’s maximization problem, which can be written as
max
τB ,TB
τBpiB + TB
s.t. (1− τB)ΠB − τB (2tF − τB)2γ − TB ≥ ΠA
where piB = ΠB − τB−tFγ from the firm’s profit declaration choice. Denoting by λ the
Lagrange multiplier for the constraint of this problem, the corresponding Lagrangian
function is
L = τBΠB − τB τB − tF
γ
+ TB + λ
[
(1− τB)ΠB − τB (2tF − τB)2γ − TB −ΠA
]
and first-order and complementary slackness conditions are
∂L
∂τB
= 0 ⇐⇒ ΠB − 2τB − tF
γ
− λΠB − λtF − τB
γ
= 0
∂L
∂TB
= 0 ⇐⇒ λ = 1
λ
[
(1− τB)ΠB − τB (2tF − τB)2γ − TB −ΠA
]
= 0, λ ≥ 0
Since λ = 1, the constraint always holds with equality, and the first condition reduces
to − τBγ = 0, from which it follows that τ∗B = 0. Hence, it is straightforward to conclude
that country B’s welfare maximizing fiscal package is given by
(τ∗B, T
∗
B) = (0,ΠB −ΠA)
Such a tax pair always induces the multinational to invest in B and leads to a welfare
in that country (and in the region as a whole) equal to WBB =W
R,Tax
B = ΠB −ΠA.
This is the equilibrium of the non-linear-tax-competition-for-FDI game between
countries A and B. Indeed, it is always possible for country B to post a bid such
26
that country A can never attract the foreign investor. Any fiscal package (τ ′B, T
′
B) which
leaves lower after-tax profits to the foreign firm is not an equilibrium strategy for coun-
try B as it gives country A the opportunity of attracting FDI with its best offer (or even
less). A fiscal package more generous than (τ∗B, T
∗
B), instead, would leave money to the
firm. For country A, then, any bid (τA, TA) is a best reply to country B’s equilibrium
strategy since A’s payoff is always nil.
Tax discrimination or tax competition
Under tax discrimination, the two governments just compete over the rate τi at which
the multinational firm’s declared profits are taxed, and the problem of country B’s
government is given by
max
τB
τBpiB
s.t. (1− τB)ΠB + (τB − τA) (τ − tF )
γ
≥ (1− τA)ΠA
where piB = ΠB− τB−tFγ from (5). Since we are dealing with a single-variable maximiza-
tion problem with one constraint, the solution is either an unconstrained maximum -
resulting from the maximization of the objective function without the constraint - or it
comes from the constraint itself, which is binding. But if the constraint is not binding,
there is no real competition for FDI between countries and the latter resolves into a
new tax instrument for country B. Hence, we just consider the binding situation and
we define
f (τA, τB) ≡ (1− τB)ΠB + (τB − τA) (τ − tF )
γ
− (1− τA)ΠA = 0
so that the solution to country B’s problem is given by
τ∗B (τA) = γΠB + tF ±
√
(γΠB + tF )
2 + τA (τA − 2tF )− 2γ [ΠB − (1− τA)ΠA]
which, given country A’s best offer to the foreign firm, i.e., τA = 0, reduces to
τ∗B (0) = γΠB + tF ±
√
(γΠB + tF )
2 − 2γ (ΠB −ΠA)
Note that f (·, ·) is a convex function of τB which is increasing for τB > γΠB + tF . If
the two roots that we have just defined do not exist, this means that f (·, ·) > 0, i.e.,
the after-tax profits from investing in B always exceed those from investing in A, hence
country B always attracts FDI for any τB it sets. If the two roots exist, instead, they
will both be positive, but the only acceptable solution is the smaller one as the larger one
violates the non-negative-profit-declaration condition, which requires τB < γΠB + tF .
Therefore, country B always attracts FDI by setting
τ∗B (0) ≡ τˆB = γΠB + tF −
√
(γΠB + tF )
2 − 2γ (ΠB −ΠA)
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and regional welfare is given by WRB,Disc = W
B
B = τˆB
(
ΠB − τˆB−tFγ
)
= ΠB − ΠA − τˆ
2
B
2γ
where the last equality is obtained by using f (0, τB) = 0.
The equilibrium of the tax-discrimination game between countries A and B can be
defined as follows:
τ∗A = , with  ∈ (0,∞)
τˆB : ΠB(τˆB) = ΠA (0)
Indeed, it is always possible for country B to set a tax rate such that country A can never
attract the foreign investor. Any τB > τˆB is not an equilibrium strategy for country B
as it gives country A the opportunity of attracting FDI with its best offer, i.e., τA = 0.
By contrast, any τB < τˆB would leave money to the firm. For country A, then, any
τA ∈ (0,∞) is a best reply to τˆB since A always earns a zero payoff.
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